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We analyze whether the liquidity provision in a pure order book market during normal mar-
ket conditions (low volatility regime) differs from what is observed when the market is under
stress (high volatility regime). We show that the static relationship between liquidity and volatil-
ity is resilient to regime changes in volatility. Nevertheless, we do ﬁnd that it is more costly to
trade when volatility is large. A VAR analysis shows that the liquidity dynamics is similar in the
low and high volatility regimes, although the drop in liquidity subsequent to volatility shocks is
larger in the high volatility regime. Finally, the market is more resilient to volatility or liquidity
shocks in periods of turmoils.
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Modelling and appraising liquidity in ﬁnancial markets has been of paramount importance for cen-
tral banks, regulators and practitioners for the last decade. The perceived liquidity decrease during
the ﬁnancial crisis of 1998 has led many to question the functioning of stock markets during stress
periods (see Borio, 2004, and references given therein). Moreover, the well-publicized problems
of large hedge funds such as LTCM have also pointed out that liquidity could dry out rapidly dur-
ing crisis periods, hence normal market conditions do not offer much information regarding what
happens during volatile periods. As pointed out in the empirical and theoretical literature, liquidity
depends crucially on the market structure. In price-driven markets (e.g. at the NASDAQ in its pre-
1996 version or in bond and FOREX markets), a market maker ensures the continuity and viability
of the trading process by quoting ﬁrm bid and ask prices whatever the market conditions. Thus,
the inside spread (i.e. the difference between the best buy and sell prices) and depth at the best
quotes seem to be good measures of the available liquidity, that is on an ex-ante basis. Ex-post, the
liquidity of an exchange is often assessed by computing measures such as the effective or realized
spread, or VWAP (volume-weighted average price) measures. Note that measures related to the
liquidity displayed by the order book (which is fully described below) refer to pre-trade liquidity,
and will correspondingly be referred to as ex-ante liquidity measures. Examples of such measures
are the quoted spread and bid/ask depths. Measures computed with transaction data refer to realized
trading costs, thus called ex-post liquidity measures. Effective spread is a well-known example of
an ex-post liquidity measure.
In pure order-driven markets, no market maker stands ready to trade. Liquidity is thus provided
by limit orders entered throughout the day by ‘patient’ or liquidity supplier investors (often value
investors), and orders are executed only when prices match, i.e when liquidity is demanded by
‘impatient’ or liquidity demander investors. Examples of impatient traders include traders who
wish to transact near the close of the trading session (so that the price of their trade is not far from
the ofﬁcial closing price), see Cushing and Madhavan (2000), or momentum traders who are keen
on entering immediate long or short positions (Keim and Madhavan, 1997). Therefore, the inside
spread is not as relevant as in price-driven markets and depth outside the quotes (i.e. the complete
state of the order book) and times between order entry and execution (the immediacy component)
become crucial. As shown in Handa and Schwartz (1996), and discussed below, there exists a
1dynamical equilibrium between limit order and market order trading which strongly determines the
available liquidity of the order book.
While in a price-driven market the market makers ensure the continuity of the price process,
no investors have to provide liquidity in order book markets.1 As such, in order book markets, the
available liquidity is the outcome of the yet non-executed limit orders posted by patient traders. It
has been well documented that traders enter limit orders at a price that takes into account the so-
called picking-off risk. Indeed, a limit order is more likely to be executed against an order submitted
by an informed trader, or after adverse price changes. In the second case, the risk stems from the
lack of monitoring of the trader’s positions in the book, i.e. the trader did not cancel her order and
new public information was disclosed after the submission of the order.2 When trading becomes
hectic, picking-off risk may rise to such a level that no market participant has an incentive to supply
liquidity to the market. For example, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) highlight such a behavior at
the NYSE. After two market-wide trading halts, the book was empty and most of the trading was
redirected to the ﬂoor crowd. However, their results may not readily be extended to a pure limit
order book platform as the presence of specialists at the NYSE offers an alternative to the book;
this is not possible in a pure order book market.3 Finally, events such as the Asian crisis show that
the market response to high volatility can be markedly different from what is observed in normal
periods, which suggests that the liquidity-volatility relationship may be non-linear. This is consistent
with a picking-off risk that does not increase linearly with respect to price volatility. Therefore, it is
notinconceivablethatorderbooksystemscouldbreakdownintimesofstressbecausethedynamical
equilibrium of Handa and Schwartz (1996) between limit orders and market orders is disrupted.
In this paper we analyze the liquidity behavior across different volatility regimes for some stocks
traded on the Euronext trading platform during the December 2, 2002 - April 30, 2003 time pe-
riod. More precisely, we study whether liquidity supply and demand are more responsive to price
changes when volatility is large. If this is indeed the case, then liquidity drops during volatile pe-
riods should be more pronounced that during normal market conditions and the behavior of market
liquidity under regular market conditions cannot be extended to stress periods (and even less to
extreme events). Thereafter, a period with a high level of volatility will be referred to as a ‘stress pe-
1For example the specialists at the NYSE, which is best characterized as an hybrid market (i.e. a combination of
a price-driven market, an order book market and a ﬂoor market), are required by the exchange to maintain an ‘orderly
market’.
2Or previously private information was made public.
3Indeed the authors stress that, for the smallest cap stocks in their sample, the liquidity drain from the book to the
ﬂoor trading was not so pronounced, probably because the ﬂoor crowd is smaller for the smallest cap stocks.
2riod’, while low volatility periods are referred to as ‘normal periods’. Note that, in contrast to most
papers (e.g. Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004)) dealing with high volatility periods, we do not focus
on one (or succession of) extreme event(s). In our empirical analysis, using high-frequency trade
and order book data, we analyze the liquidity and volatility exhibited by some large- and mid-cap
Brussels traded stocks on the Euronext platform. We study more particularly the contemporaneous
relationships between volatility and ex-ante/ex-post liquidity to ascertain if the high volatility was
associated with decreases in liquidity and large trading costs. From an econometric point of view,
the low and high volatility regime states are determined according to an endogenous classiﬁcation
rule based on Markov switching models. Besides the ex-ante and ex-post assessment of liquidity,
we also estimate VAR models for some of the variables measured on an intraday basis. Thereafter,
we assess the impulse response functions derived from these estimated VAR models and analyze
the dynamics of liquidity. Because we choose stocks for which there are no market makers, we thus
shed light on the ex-ante and ex-post liquidity vs volatility relationships in a pure automated auction
market.
The results (which also include an event study for one of the stock) indicate that while ex-ante
or ex-post trading costs somewhat increase with volatility, the (static) relationship between liquidity
and volatility does not undergo fundamental changes and the trading process does not break down.
The dynamical analysis based on the VAR model offers a balanced view according to which the
volatility regime bears moderately on the dynamics of the liquidity provision. Liquidity dynamics
in the low and high volatility regimes are similar, but traders ‘overreact’ in the high volatility regime
as the decrease in liquidity in response to volatility shocks is larger in the high volatility regime.
Finally, the market is more resilient to volatility or liquidity shocks in periods of turmoils. As such,
our results seem to indicate that there is no real important deterioration in the provision of liquidity
when volatility increases, although we do ﬁnd that it is more costly to trade when volatility is high
and that the market dynamics are somewhat affected.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. After this introduction, we present a review of the
literature in Section 2. The Euronext trading system and the dataset are discussed in Section 3. The
ﬁrst part of the empirical analysis is presented in Section 4, where we also provide an event study for
the Delhaize stock. The second part of the empirical analysis (trading dynamics and VAR analysis)
is presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
32. Review of the literature
2.1. Automated auction markets, liquidity and volatility
The literature on market microstructure has traditionally focused on dealership markets. Indeed,
most of the models surveyed in O’Hara (1995) focus on the behavior of market makers or deal with
ﬁxed costs, inventory costs or asymmetric information costs models in the framework of market
maker based trading systems. Because of the growing popularity of automated auction systems in
European countries or in the electronic trading systems in the United States, there is now a rapidly
evolving literature on order book markets.4 Most of the empirical studies in that ﬁeld focus on the
provision of liquidity in automated auction markets. Indeed, as no market makers stand ready to
buy and sell the traded assets in this setting, the viability of pure electronic order book markets and
the ability to trade at all times are far from ascertained. Crucially, the provision of liquidity in times
of crisis is of paramount importance. We thereafter survey some of the recent empirical work that
focuses on the provision of liquidity in order book markets, the relationship between volatility and
liquidity and the characteristics of automated auction markets in times of crisis.
In an important extension of pure dealership markets, automated auction markets allow a rela-
tively easy ex-ante characterization of liquidity beyond the inside bid-ask spread. Because the state
of the order book is usually fully or partially made available to market participants, price impact
curves (i.e. unit bid and ask prices for a given volume, also called costs of buy and sell trades
by Irvine, Benston, and Kandel, 2000) can be computed which allow the computation of extended
liquidity measures such as the cost of buy or sell trades. These measures, popularized in Irvine,
Benston, and Kandel (2000), Martinez, Tapia, and Rubio (2000), Coppejans, Domowitz, and Mad-
havan (2002) or Beltran, Giot, and Grammig (2004), aggregate the status of the order book at any
given time and offer a relatively accurate picture of the available ex-ante liquidity, i.e. before the
submission of a buy or sell trade.5
Inanowseminalpaper, Biais, Hillion, andSpatt(1995)provideoneoftheﬁrstempiricalanalysis
of a limit order book market (the Paris Bourse). They study the joint dynamics of the order ﬂow
(placement of market or limit orders) and the order book: investors place limit (market) orders
4See the book by Harris (2002).
5In dealership markets, the ex-ante available liquidity often reduces to the best bid and ask prices (or quoted spread),
and the available depth at these prices. Effective spreads or realized spreads are ex-post liquidity measures as they are
computed after the submission of the buy or sell trade.
4when the bid-ask spread is large (small) or the order book is thin (thick). Therefore, “investors
provide liquidity when it is valuable to the marketplace and consume liquidity when it is plentiful”.
They also show that there is a strong competition among traders (who monitor the state of the
order book) to provide liquidity as the ﬂow of order placements is concentrated at or inside the
bid-ask quote and the corresponding limit orders are placed in quick succession. For stocks traded
on the pure electronic limit order platform of the Hong Kong stock exchange, Ahn, Bae, and Chan
(2001) investigate the ‘ecological’ nature of the pure order driven market such as put forward in
Handa and Schwartz (1996). They show that there exists a dynamical equilibrium between limit
order trading and volatility: market depth rises subsequent to increases in volatility and volatility
declines subsequent to increases in market depth. Indeed volatility attracts the placement of limit
orders (instead of market orders) which therefore add liquidity to the order book. They also show
the need to separate volatility at the ask and bid sides of the order book: when volatility arises
from the ask (bid) side, investors submit more limit sell (buy) orders than market sell (buy) orders.
On a related topic and for NYSE stocks, Bae, Jang, and Park (2003) show that it is important to
distinguish between transitory and informational volatility: “a rise in transitory volatility induces
a new placement of limit orders. A rise in informational volatility appear neither to increase nor
decrease the placement of limit orders relative to market orders”. Using a Probit model applied to
Swiss stocks traded on the Swiss Stock Exchange, Ranaldo (2004) presents quite similar results:
orders are more aggressive (i.e. traders submit more marketable limit orders than just plain limit
orders) when the order queue on the incoming trader’s side of the book is larger. Forexample, buyers
thenfaceasmallerexecutionprobabilityandhavetoraisetheirorderaggressiveness. Theoppositeis
true for sellers. Moreover, volatility and larger spreads imply weaker trading aggressiveness. Frino,
McInish, and Toner (1998) study the intraday pattern of the spread for two competing structures (a
ﬂoor and an order book) where the same asset is traded (German Bund futures) and conclude that
the order book provides more liquidity than the ﬂoor, although the performance of the automated
auction market deteriorates when volatility increases (however they only focus on one liquidity
variable, the quoted spread). Note that these studies do not focus on times of crises and it is thus not
clear whether they would get similar results when trading is hectic.
Danielsson and Payne (2001) study the dynamics of liquidity supply and demand in the Reuters
D2000-2 order book trading system.6 They focus on the interaction between market and limit or-
ders and show that the probability of a limit buy (sell) order is relatively low after a market sell
6The Reuters D2000-2 system is an electronic order book system designed for inter-dealer FOREX trades.
5(buy). Therefore, there could be strong ﬂuctuations in the provision of liquidity because of the com-
plex interplay between market and limit orders (what they call dynamic illiquidity). In agreement
with Foucault (1999), they show that the fraction of limit orders in total order arrivals increases
with volatility (which increases liquidity), although the bid-ask spread also increases with volatility
(which decreases liquidity). Hence, increases in volatility yield wider bid-ask spreads and lead to
the increased placement of limit order relatively far from the quote mid-point. They also show that
market participants react strongly to the unanticipated component of volume (predictable volume
increases liquidity, unpredictable decreases liquidity). This hints at the importance of asymmetric
information in automated auction markets and suggests the need for extensions of the models by
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987).
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) focus on the liquidity provision at the New York Stock Exchange
during extreme market crises. Indeed, they deal with the very short time period that surrounds
October 27, 1997. On that day, the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 554 points (which triggered
the circuit breakers) and on October 28, 1997 the index shot up by 337 points. They examine the
liquidity supplied by the limit orders (routed by the SuperDOT order book trading system) and by
the NYSE market participants (specialists and ﬂoor brokers). They show that a substantial liquidity
drain occurred on the day after the market crash (i.e. on October 28, 1997) as the order book
exhibited continuous large spreads and poor depth. However, the overall market liquidity did not
drop dramatically as the specialists and ﬂoor brokers fulﬁlled their functions of liquidity providers
and thus ensured good overall depth and low spreads at the NYSE. This hints at the adequacy of
hybrid7 market structures and shows that the viability of pure automated auction markets in times of
crisis can be threatened by the signiﬁcant drop in liquidity due to the substantial fall in the number
of limit orders entered in the trading system.8 Finally, Venkatamaran (2001) also stresses the merits
of hybrid trading structures which lead to reduced trading costs.
Most empirical studies thus conclude that the ‘ecological’ nature of the pure order driven market
works quite well: traders enter limit orders when liquidity is needed and are more impatient when
liquidity is plentiful. Automated auction markets are also quite cheap to run, and bid-ask spreads for
small to medium trades are quite low (see also Degryse, 1999). It is however not clear whether these
results hold in all circumstances. Indeed, almost all studies (Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) being
7A hybrid trading structure combines features of order book markets (the existence of a centralized order book run
by a computer system) and of dealership markets (the existence of market makers or ﬂoor brokers). A good example of
such a structure is the NYSE, see for example Bauwens and Giot (2001) or Soﬁanos and Werner (2000).
8Note however that it is ‘easy’ for traders to avoid the order book as they know that they can rely on the specialist in
a hybrid trading structure.
6the exception) on automated auction markets focus on the provision of liquidity in normal periods,
i.e. not in times of crisis. In that latter case, liquidity could rapidly deteriorate if the sole provision
of liquidity comes from limit orders (i.e. in the absence of hybrid systems that allow some provision
of liquidity by market makers).
2.2. The regulator’s point of view
During the nineties, the growing concern in monetary economics has been the opportunity for mon-
etary authorities to react to stock market crashes and ﬁnancial distress. The key question is whether
Central Banks should have a prudential role in targeting ﬁnancial stability. This is clearly rele-
vant as history is plentiful of periods where ﬁnancial instability involved macroeconomic instability.
According to this paradigm, a ﬁnancial crisis, because it acts for instance on the solvability of ﬁnan-
cial intermediaries, could affect the activity of ﬁrms through credit rationing, also called the credit
crunch.9 See Bernanke and Gertler (1995) and Bernanke and Gertler (1999). A key underpinning of
this rationale is that price and ﬁnancial stability are symbiotic in order to maintain a sustainable non
inﬂationary growth. Solow argued that Central Banks should aim for ﬁnancial stability as a larger
risky asset volatility increases the probability of failure for ﬁnancial institutions. If the Central Bank
does not include the ﬁnancial stability criterium as a monetary policy target, an increasing number
of failures is to be expected which would be costly for the economy.10 In the same vein and because
the potential vulnerability of ﬁnancial systems increases the probability of huge and costly crises
(Borio, 2003), Borio and Lowe (2002) call for the inclusion of a ﬁnancial target along the usual
macroeconomic targets. Of course, this issue is controversial because it implies an ability to deter-
mine an equilibrium level for ﬁnancial prices (Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani, 2000 and
Borio and Lowe, 2002) discuss this problem). Note also that theoretical models and discussions of
this problem (Bernanke and Gertler, 1999 and Borio and Lowe, 2002) yield ambiguous results and
raise the issue of the choice of the ﬁnancial asset whose price must be monitored.
Recently, Mishkin and White (2002) analyze ﬁfteen historical episodes of stock market crashes
in the US and examine the aftermath of these crises. Interestingly, their study suggests that stock
market crashes by themselves do not involve ﬁnancial instability. They show that the state of the
ﬁnancial system and the nature of stress in ﬁnancial markets seem to be important. In particular,
9An example is the constraint in the real activity in Japan from 1992 onwards.
10See Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Cecchetti, Genberg, Lipsky, and Wadhwani (2000) or Durr´ e (2003) for a discus-
sion.
7rapidly falling stock prices in conjunction with decreasing liquidity may be particularly destabiliz-
ing.11 Therefore, as a ﬁrst step towards a prudential role of monetary authorities, a comprehensive
understanding of the dynamics of liquidity during stress periods is warranted. Moreover, a closer
look at the relationship between liquidity and volatility in times of crisis sheds light on key issues
relevant to Central Banks and regulators in the future.
3. The Euronext platform and the dataset
3.1. Trading on the Euronext platform
Euronext encompasses ﬁve exchanges, namely the Amsterdam, Brussels, Lisbon, Paris exchanges
and the LIFFE. Euronext aims to put forward a unique electronic trading platform for all ﬁnancial
assets. This is already the case for equities trading, as the same trading platform is now used by
all exchanges. Trading on the Euronext platform takes place from 9 to 5.25 p.m CET. Limit or-
ders are matched according to the standard price and time priority rules. Market orders (also called
marketable limit orders) are executed against the best (in terms of price) prevailing order on the
opposite side of the book. If there is not enough volume to fully execute the incoming order, the
remaining part of the order is transformed into a limit order at the best price. Traders can also use
more sophisticated orders, e.g. ﬁll-or-kill orders (the limit order is either fully executed or can-
celled), must-be-ﬁlled orders (the market order is completely executed, whatever the price), iceberg
orders (part of the volume is not displayed in the book),...Block trading is allowed for large volume
trades (the size of these trades is larger than the stock speciﬁc minimum block size, called “Taille
normale de bloc”). Although the block trade formally takes place outside the book (akin to the up-
stairs market at the NYSE), the transaction price is actually constrained by the available liquidity in
the book. Indeed, Euronext displays throughout the day the hypothetical prices for a sell and a buy
order with a volume equal to the minimum block volume. No blocks can be traded at a price outside
these limits. Besides block trades, Euronext also allows so-called iceberg (or hidden) orders. As the
name suggests, a hidden limit order is not (fully) visible in the order book. This implies that if a
market order is executed against a hidden order, the trader submitting the market order may receive
an unexpected price improvement. As on other automated auction exchanges (XETRA, Toronto
11Mishkin and White (2002) point out for instance that the responses of the Federal Reserve during the stock market
declines in 1929 and 1987 were more appropriate than during the recent decline which began in 2000.
8stock exchange,...), iceberg orders have been allowed to heed the request of investors who were
reluctant to see their (potentially large) limit orders openly revealed in the order book.12
At the start of the trading day and before the regular continuous trading, a pre-opening auction
takes place: limit orders are submitted and a start-of-day auction sets the opening price; all orders
not executed at the end of the opening period remain in the order book.13 Throughout the trading
day, achievable trade prices are bounded by a static and a dynamic price limit. The static bounds
are set immediately after the opening auction: they are equal to the auction price +- 10%. During
the day, if a trade takes place outside these static bounds, trading is stopped and a new auction
takes place (for a time period of 5 minutes). This auction ﬁnal price deﬁnes new static bounds,
used thereafter. The second type of bounds are dynamic: a trade cannot take place at a price larger
(smaller) than the last trade price plus 2% (minus 2%). If orders can be matched at a transaction
price outside the dynamic bounds, the trade is not executed and trading is stopped. A new auction
takes place and deﬁnes new static and dynamic bounds. A ﬁnal auction occurs between 5.25 and
5.30 p.m., followed by an additional 10-minute period where traders can trade at the price set by the
end-of-day auction.
Note that, depending on the stock, two different Euronext members are involved in the trading
process: brokers (called “N´ egociateurs”) and market makers (called “Animateurs de march´ e”). All
stocks do not feature a market maker. Indeed, stocks belonging to the Euronext 100 index (the ﬁrst
100 Euronext stocks which have the largest market capitalizations) don’t feature any market maker.
Nevertheless, market makers are still allowed to enter orders for these stocks, but then they are
considered as simple brokers.
3.2. The dataset
We were granted access to two historical datasets (for Brussels-traded stocks over a period ranging
from December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003) by Euronext. The ﬁrst dataset contains the limit order
book (LOB) as available to market participants who are not formally Euronext members, i.e. the
historical real-time feed of the 5 best orders (price, total volume at that price and number of standing
limit orders at that price) on the bid and ask sides of the order book. Indeed, all order book events
(order entry, cancellation,...) are time-stamped to the second and lead to a potential order book
12See D’Hondt, De Winne, and Francois-Heude (2002) for a description of hidden orders on the Euronext trading
platform.
13See also Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1999).
9modiﬁcation, which is recorded in real-time by Euronext. We thus have snapshots of the 5 best
bid and ask limit orders in real-time over the historical period we work with. It should however be
stressed that the hidden portion of the iceberg orders is not included in the dataset. As discussed
below, this will impact some of our conclusions (regarding the available ex-ante liquidity in the
order book for example), while others should not be affected (the ex-post assessment of trading
costs for example). The second dataset contains all transactions, more speciﬁcally the prices and
volumes of the trades time-stamped to the second. Moreover, we also know if the orders matched in
the transaction were so-called client or proprietary orders (the two most frequent cases), or market
maker orders (a third possibility).14 Note that the LOB dataset sometimes contains errors as the
ordering of prices is not always enforced (e.g. the best ask price is sometimes larger than the ask
price ranked second). These errors amount to less than 2% percent of all LOB observations and
are removed from the dataset. Furthermore, the trades dataset did not give any information on the
side (buy or sell) from which the trade originated. By using the LOB data, we are however able to
determine rigourously the sign of the trade, as trades can only occur at the prices displayed in the
book. Thus we did not have to rely on the Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm as used by most authors
who work with NYSE data.
In this study we focus on ﬁve large-cap Belgian stocks (Dexia, Electrabel, Fortis, Interbrew
and KBC) and ﬁve mid-cap Belgian Stocks (Agfa, Colruyt, Delhaize, Solvay and UCB).15 The
ﬁrst ﬁve stocks are characterized by a large trading activity and are well-known blue-chip stocks
widely held by individual and institutional investors. The ﬁve mid-cap stocks are also quite actively
traded stocks. All ten stocks are members of the BEL20 stock index (which features the most
‘representative’ stocks of the Belgian economy) and no market maker (also called “animateur de
march´ e”) is involved in the trading of any of these stocks. Descriptive characteristics for the selected
stocks are given in Table I. The stock price for Fortis (whose pattern is representative of what can be
observed for the other stocks, save for the Colruyt stock which has been strongly trending upwards
since the end of 2002) is plotted in the top left of Figure 2. This ﬁgure shows that the stock price
was in a sharp downtrend till the start of the second Gulf war and that the market sharply recovered
thereafter. In the remaining of the paper, we will focus on two representative stocks, Fortis and
Colruyt, and for all the other stocks ‘on average’. Colruyt (Fortis) is the smallest (largest) cap stock
14A so-called client order is an order routed to a Euronext member for execution by an outside investor. A proprietary
order is executed by a Euronext member for his own trading account.
15This classiﬁcation of large- and mid-cap stocks is relevant for average European investors. Some US investors
would consider all these stocks to be only mid-cap stocks, and some of these even almost small-cap stocks.
10in our sample. The results for the other stocks are similar except when we speciﬁcally state that
there is a difference.
4. Empirical analysis
4.1. The importance of intraday seasonality
Most empirical studies on high-frequency data (Engle and Russell, 1998; Bisi` ere and Kamionka,
2000; Bauwens and Giot, 2001; Bauwens and Giot, 2003) stress the need to correctly model the
intraday seasonality exhibited by this kind of data. Indeed, when modelling the volatility, the traded
volume, or the spread on an intraday basis, it is of paramount importance to proceed along a four-
step procedure: (1) deﬁne regularly time-spaced measures of interest (e.g. working at the 15-minute
frequency, the 15-minute return volatility, the 15-minute traded volume, the average effective spread
over the 15-minute interval,...); (2) compute the time-of-day pattern for each measure; (3) desea-
sonalize each measure by its respective time-of-day pattern; (4) model the deseasonalized variable
using an econometric model. Failure to recognize the importance of steps (2) and (3) often lead to
incorrect model estimations (see Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997, for an application to the modelling
of intraday volatility). Moreover there is also an economic justiﬁcation in the modelling of the intra-
day seasonality. Because market participants are actively involved in the day-to-day market action,
they know and expect a given pattern of activity (or volatility, spread,...) and are only affected by
deviations (or surprises) from what was expected. A well-known example is the reaction of eco-
nomic agents to news announcements: by itself, the news (e.g. the CPI number in the US) is not
really relevant; what matters is the difference between the actual number and the expected number
(see e.g. Bauwens, Ben Omrane, and Giot, 2003 or Andersen, Bollerslev, Diebold, and Vega, 2003).
As an illustration, we plot in Figures 1 and 2 the time-of-day pattern for the annualized volatility
of the 15-minute returns, the 15-minute traded volume, the ask inside depth, the current and effective
spread and the price impacts for the bid side. Current spreads, effective spreads and the ask inside
depth are deﬁned as usual, see Harris (2002).16 Price impacts capture the premium paid by traders
16Note that, because we deal with an automated auction market, the effective spread can be larger than the current
spread, as some transactions walk up the book and thus transaction prices are larger than the quoted spread.
11when the transaction is executed against standing limit orders beyond the best quotes. Formally, the

















The same formula is used for the ask side. A bid price impact of , say, 2% for a trade of 10,000
sharesmeansthateachsharecosts2%morethanifallshareshadbeentradedatthebestbidprice. By
construction, the larger the transaction (i.e. the larger v), the larger the price paid as the market order
hits more and more limit orders and is likely to walk up further in the book. We compute the price
impacts for a volume v equal to 0.5, 1, 1.5 and 2 times a reference volume (the corresponding price
impacts are labelled price impact level 1 to 4). The reference volume corresponds to a transaction
for a nominal amount of 30,000 euros divided by the average price over the sample; this provides
an easy comparison across stocks. Price impacts measure liquidity as offered by the book on an ex-
ante basis, i.e before the transaction takes place. Finally, we also compute the trade aggressiveness,
which measures how much traders use the book. It is computed as the volume-weighted average
of the trades which are matched by standing limit orders strictly beyond the best quotes.17 When
trading volume rises, trade aggressiveness can remain low if the book provides more liquidity to the
market (thus quoted depths rise).
The ﬁrst ﬁgure is for Colruyt (the smallest cap stock in our sample and the least active in terms
of average number of transactions per day), while the second ﬁgure is for Fortis (the largest cap
stock in our sample and the most active in terms of average number of transactions per day). While
both stocks are markedly different in terms of market cap and trading activity (see Table I), the time-
of-day patterns are, broadly speaking, quite similar. As suggested by either Figure 1 or 2 (which are
representative of the patterns exhibited by the other eight stocks, smallest cap stocks are closest to
Colruyt, largest cap stocks are more similar to Fortis), trading activity tends to be large at the start
of the day, slows down around lunch time and picks up in the middle of the afternoon session. This
latter afternoon activity is consistent with the well-known inﬂuence of the pre-opening and opening
of the US stock markets on the dynamics of the European markets. At the start of the trading session
17For example, a buy trade must be matched with at least one standing limit order above the best ask price to be
characterized as being ‘aggressive’.
12on Euronext, the volatility, along with the traded volume for some stocks, is particularly high. For
most of the stocks, traded volume increases at the end of the day while the increases in volatility
appear more subdued. As far as the order book is concerned, it provides a reasonable amount of
liquidity throughout the day. Although the spreads and price impacts are larger at the opening,
they remain small and stable throughout the trading day, with a slight deterioration near the close
of the trading session.18 Depths at the quotes are up by roughly 50% in the afternoon compared
with the morning. Moreover and although trading volumes are larger after 2 pm, transaction costs,
as measured by the effective spread, are quite low and constant, except at the start of the trading
session where traders have to pay twice the price they pay during the rest of the day. Indeed, despite
the increase in traded volume in the afternoon, the provision of liquidity by limit orders in the book
seems to avoid a sharp increase in transaction costs. These empirical facts are consistent with the
previous ﬁndings reported in the literature, although it is well known that exchanges somewhat
differ in their time-of-day pattern at the close of trading (see Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) for
the Paris Bourse, Beltran, Giot, and Grammig (2004) for the Frankfurt XETRA platform, Hamao
and Hasbrouck (1995) for the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) for the
NASDAQ or Brockman and Chung (1998) and Ahn and Cheung (1999) for the Hong Kong stock
exchange).
4.2. The contemporaneous relationship between volatility and the liquidity
measures
The main goal of the paper is to study how market conditions and liquidity are affected by volatility.
As discussed above, what matters for market participants are deviations from expected volatility,
hence the need to focus on the deseasonalized volatility and its contemporaneous relationship with
(deseasonalized) liquidity measures. While the raw data are ﬁrst pre-sampled at the 15-minute fre-
quency (to deﬁne the 15-minute returns and to compute the time-of-day patterns as given above for
example), we thereafter focus on 4 sub-intervals which span one trading day: [9h:11h], [11h:13h],
[13h:15h] and [15h:17h30]. The [9h:11h] interval is just after the market open, [11h:13h] ends
with the traders’ lunchtime, [13h:15h] ranges from the start of the afternoon trading up to the New
York pre-open and [15h:17h30] should capture the increased activity due to the opening of the US
markets and ends with the close of trading on the Euronext platform. Besides, the switch from 15-
18Note that the ﬁgures for the ask side of the book are very similar to those presented for the bid side. Hence they are
not given here but are available on request.
13minute intervals to 2-hour intervals is consistent with the notion of realized volatility (see below)
as a volatility measure computed from the ‘aggregation’ of really high-frequency squared returns.
As such, estimation results (see the log-log regressions below) from models where the volatility is
the independent variable should be less noisy. With respect to these 4 intervals, we thus compute
the realized volatility, aggregated effective spread, aggregated quoted spread, aggregated trade ag-
gressiveness, aggregated ask and bid depths and different measures of the aggregated ask and bid
price impacts (as deﬁned above). We now proceed with the deﬁnition of these aggregated measures
computed from the data sampled at the 15-minute frequency.
First and following Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) or Giot and Laurent (2004), we deﬁne the
realized volatility as the sum of the intraday squared returns which pertain to the required intervals.
As shown in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), the realized volatility measure provides a model-free
estimation of return volatility over a given time interval (provided that high-frequency returns are
available). For example, with 15-minute returns and for the [11h-13h] time interval, the realized




where r11h15 is the 15-minute return for the [11h-11h15] time interval and r13h is the 15-minute
return for the [12h45-13h] time interval on December 2, 2002. The aggregated effective spread,
quoted spread, trade aggressiveness, ask and bid depths and price impacts are respectively the mean
effective spread, mean quoted spread, mean trade aggressiveness, mean depths and mean price im-
pacts (computed from the 15-minute intervals) averaged over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and
[15h:17h30] intervals.
In a second step and for each interval, the time-of-day pattern of each measure is computed.
Next we compute the deseasonalized variables by dividing each measure by its respective time-
of-day. We then assess the contemporaneous relationships between the liquidity variable and the
volatility by estimating the following log-log regressions:
ln(Xi) = b0+b1ln(RVi)+ei; i = 1:::N; (4)
where Xi is successively Si, Qi, TAi, DBi, DAi, BPIi and APIi (respectively the deseasonalized ag-
gregated effective spread, quoted spread, trade aggressiveness, bid depth, ask depth, bid price im-
14pact and ask price impact), RVi is the deseasonalized realized volatility and N is the total number
of observations. Because we use log-log regressions, b1 can be interpreted as an elasticity that
‘links’ the deseasonalized variables. The interpretation of these elasticities is as follows. For the
ln(Si) = b0+b1ln(RVi)+ei regression for example, a b1 of 0.3 would imply that a 100% increase
in the level of realized volatility (with respect to its expected level based on the time-of-day) would
yield a 30% increase in the effective spread (with respect to its expected level based on the time-of-
day).
Estimation results are given in the top panel of Table II. To save space, we present the full results
for the Colruyt and Fortis stocks only. Next to these full results, we also report the results for ‘all
stocks’ on average, that is we give the mean elasticity across stocks. As an illustration, we also plot
the relationship between the deseasonalized aggregated effective spread and the deseasonalized re-
alized volatility in Figure 3. The results indicate that the elasticity for the effective spread - realized
volatility relationship is around 10% for Fortis, around 28% for Colruyt, and a bit more than 22% for
the ten stocks on average. For the trade aggressiveness - realized volatility relationship, the elastici-
ties range from a low of 7.4% (Fortis) to a high of 32.9% (Colruyt), with the average across stocks
being equal to 15.7%. Figure 3 (and a similar ﬁgure for the trade aggressiveness, not reported here)
also shows that there is no sharp deterioration in market liquidity when volatility increases sharply.
Indeed a positive relationship between both effective spread and trade aggressiveness vs realized
volatility is at play (which is expected from the market microstructure literature), but this positive
dependence is somewhat muted (see below for additional discussions). As expected, the smallest
cap stock (Colruyt) exhibits a more pronounced upward trending relationship than the largest cap
stock (Fortis). Plots for the other stocks are quite similar to what is given in Figure 3.
The analysis for the quoted spread and depths yields similar results. Table III shows that the
elasticity for the quoted spread - realized volatility relationship is around 12% for Fortis, and is equal
to 24% on average for all the stocks. Furthermore, while there is a negative relationship between
the depth (for both sides of the order book) and the realized volatility, it is not signiﬁcant for most
stocks. We also look at the relationship between the deseasonalized aggregated price impact (level
1 to 4) and the deseasonalized realized volatility (this last analysis thus uses information provided
by the full limit order book dataset). The outputs of these log-log regressions are also given in Table
III but we only present the level 3 price impacts to save space. In contrast to the bid and ask depths
results, these level 3 elasticities are signiﬁcant and are close to 15% on average for all stocks, with a
15low around 9% to 10% for Fortis and close to 20% for Colruyt. The level 1, 2 and 4 elasticities and
the detailed results for all the stocks deliver the same qualitative results.
4.2.1. High and low volatility regimes
Up to now we analyzed the whole bunch of observations put together, i.e. we did not deal separately
with high volatility and low volatility time periods. Thereafter we split the deseasonalized measures
deﬁned on the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals into a low volatility and
high volatility subset. To construct the two sub-datasets, we apply a two-state Markov switching
model (such as introduced by Hamilton, 1989) to the series of deseasonalized realized volatility.
Using the smoothed transition probabilities, we can then immediately determine which observations
belong to the low volatility regime and which ones can be put into the high volatility sub-dataset.
This procedure is run for each stock, i.e. each stock features its own endogenous Markov switching
classiﬁcation. An alternative would be to use the same classiﬁcation for all stocks, but then it would
no longer be endogenous to the appropriate deseasonalized realized volatility. Moreover, there are
relatively few cases when all stocks switch states at the same time (save around the start of the
second Gulf war for the ﬁve largest cap stocks).
More formally, we assume that the deseasonalized realized volatility RVi switches regime ac-
cording to an unobserved variable si: regime 1 (si = 1) is the low volatility state, while regime 2
(si = 2) is the high volatility state. At time i, the volatility state is thus si 2 f1;2g and the dynamics
of si is governed by a Markov process: P(si = 1jsi¡1 = 1) = p11, P(si = 2jsi¡1 = 1) = 1¡ p11,
P(si = 2jsi¡1 = 2) = p22 and P(si = 1jsi¡1 = 2) = 1¡ p22, where p11 (p22) is the probability of
being in the low volatility (high volatility) state at time i given that the low volatility (high volatility)
state is observed at time i¡1. In state m, the deseasonalized realized volatility is equal to µm, with
variance s2
m. We estimate the parameters of the model using the MSVAR package (maximum likeli-
hood, EM algorithm) of H.-M. Krolzig in the OX 3.3 econometric framework, which also computes
the smoothed transition probabilities. Finally, these are used to separate the observations into the
two sub-datasets. We then re-run the log-log regressions.
Estimation results for these regressions are given in the middle and bottom panels of Tables II
and III. Let us consider ﬁrst the effective spread and trade aggressiveness (Table II). A comparison
of the elasticities in both regimes for all stocks on average indicates that the numerical values are
close to one another both for the effective spread (21% versus 18%) and for the trade aggressiveness
16(18% versus 15%). In all cases, the effective spread - realized volatility and trade aggressiveness -
realized volatility elasticities do not signiﬁcantly change when volatility switches from the low- to
the high volatility state.19 In other words, these relationships (which focus mainly on the ex-post
liquidity or actual cost of trading) do not seem to signiﬁcantly deteriorate in times of high volatility.
These results are in agreement with the estimates for the limit order book dataset (quoted spread,
bid and ask depths, bid and ask price impacts) provided in Table III. As reported, most elasticities
are not signiﬁcant and only the quoted spread elasticity is really signiﬁcant during stress periods.20
This suggests that the Euronext system provides adequate liquidity in both low- and high volatility
regimes as the slopes of these key relationships do not change in a meaningful way. In contrast,
a trading system with poor liquidity would be characterized by increasing elasticities as volatility
increases, indicating that liquidity dries up in high volatility regimes.
If high volatility regimes do not signiﬁcantly impact the elasticities of the effective spread -
realized volatility and trade aggressiveness - realized volatility relationships, they do affect the mean
(or expected value) of the effective spread and trade aggressiveness. These results are reported in
TableIV. ForColruyt(the‘worstcase’intermsofdeteriorationofliquidityduringthehighvolatility
regime), the effective spread goes up by 91% and trades are more aggressive (+32%) despite the
decrease of liquidity in the book; price impacts (bid side, level 3) surged by 66% on average. This
suggests that traders were somehow reluctant to enter large orders given the low liquidity offered
by the book. As expected, ﬁgures for the largest cap stock (Fortis) indicate that the changes in the
means are more moderate. Note that Dexia is the most liquid stock as the effective spread only
increases by 10%. Broadly speaking and looking at the reported results for all the stocks (in detail
and on average), the decrease in liquidity seems very reasonable when compared with the increase
in the average volatility between the low- and high volatility regimes (nearly 400%). Moreover
and given that the amount (in share volume) of the hidden orders (not featured in our database) on
the Euronext trading platform is estimated at 30% of the total book (see D’Hondt, De Winne, and
Francois-Heude (2002)), the argument according to which there is a sufﬁcient liquidity provision
seems to be valid.
19This was tested using regression analysis and appropriately deﬁned dummy variables. Note that there is however
one exception: the Delhaize stock, for the trade aggressiveness.
20A regression analysis with appropriately deﬁned dummy variables again conﬁrms that these elasticities are not
signiﬁcantly different in the two regimes, save for the Colruyt, Delhaize, Fortis and KBC stocks (ask and bid depths
only).
174.2.2. Additional results and robustness checks
For the aggregated effective spread and aggregated trade aggressiveness, we also re-estimate some
of the log-log regressions allowing for a quadratic effect, i.e. we include the squared independent
variable as an additional explicative variable. We thus estimate:
ln(Si) = b0+b1ln(RVi)+b2(ln(RVi))2+ei; (5)
and
ln(TAi) = b0+b1ln(RVi)+b2(ln(RVi))2+ei (6)
where the variables are deﬁned as before. For the 10 stocks and for both liquidity measures, the
b2 coefﬁcient is however almost never signiﬁcant (full numerical results are available on request).
Finally, in a previous version of the paper, we also considered an exogenous volatility criteria: the
low volatility subset featured the measures for which the realized volatility was within one standard
deviation of its expected value (‘average volatility’ group) while the high volatility subset featured
the intervals for which the realized volatility was beyond one standard deviation of its expected value
(‘above-average volatility’ group). The estimation results were quite close to those shown above for
the volatility criteria based on the Markov switching process and are therefore not included in this
version of the paper. We also implemented a classiﬁcation of volatility in 5 regimes, based on an
exogenous criteria. Again, the results were similar to those presented here.
Last, it is well-known that traded volume and market activity are closely linked to observed
market volatility. Therefore, it could perhaps be argued that our volatility regimes simply corre-
spond to activity regimes. To assess this issue, we classiﬁed all periods according to a Markow
switching process applied to the deseasonalized trading activity instead of the deseasonalized re-
alized volatility. Contingency tables computed per stock show that both types of classiﬁcation are
not highly correlated. In this alternative speciﬁcation, the left- and right-hand side variables in the
log-log regressions are deﬁned as before. We therefore estimate the ln(Xi) = b0+b1ln(RVi)+ei re-
gressions in a state of low deseasonalized trading activity and high deseasonalized trading activity.
The estimated elasticities are not only very similar to those given above for the switch based on the
deseasonalized realized volatility but they are also very similar across the newly-deﬁned regimes.
This thus leads us to conclude similarly and lends further credence to the results given above.
184.3. An event study: the Delhaize stock on March 13, 2003
While the 10 stocks under review were sometimes quite volatile during the 5-month period (and in
particular around the start of the second Gulf war), it would however be wrong to classify this time
period as being ‘extreme’. This has already been highlighted in the introduction of the paper, as our
study is thus different from e.g. Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) who focus on extreme events that
led to (or preceded) temporary market shutdowns. There is however one market event in our ﬁve-
month period that could be considered as being extreme and which could be related to Goldstein and
Kavajecz (2004). More speciﬁcally, we shall thereafter discuss the behavior of the Delhaize stock
on March 13, 2003, which provides a detailed case study of the book dynamics when faced with
extremely large intraday price changes and buy-sell pressure.
The price pattern of the Delhaize stock is shown in Figure 4 for the ﬁve days centered on March
13, 2003. This ﬁgure shows that the price of the stock increased strongly on March 13, 2003, with
an intraday variation close to +50% (the intraday high was close to 18 Euros, the closing price on
March 12, 2003 was close to 12 Euros). As a result, the trading process for the Delhaize stock
was automatically suspended for some brief period of time because of the very large intraday price
changes.21 The sequence of news events on that day reads as:
- 9h58: Delhaize reports net earnings (for the 2002 ﬁscal year ) which have increased 19.3% year-
on-year;
- 10h00: Delhaize reports an increased solvability, actually much better than what was expected by
the market;
- 10h01: Delhaize declares a net dividend per share of 0.66 Euros. This amount was much larger
than what was expected by the market;
- Thereafter in the day, many analysts upgrade the stock from ‘Sell’ to ‘Neutral’ or ‘Buy’.
The very large intraday price changes for Delhaize were due to heavy buy pressure, as many
market participants unwounded short positions (in the period preceding March 13, 2003, there were
even rumors that Delhaize could go bankrupt) or acted according to the revised analysts recommen-
dations. For the sake of our study, it is therefore interesting to look at the ‘behavior’ of the order
book on March 13, 2003 and assess if these very large price movements were the result of poor
market liquidity. More precisely we look at the deseasonalized 15-minute traded volume, number
21Technically speaking, the trading process was thus brieﬂy interrupted because the maximum intraday price change
limit was reached. See Section 3.1.
19of trades, quoted spread, effective spread, trade aggressiveness, quoted bid and ask depths and bid
and ask price impacts (level 2 and 4). All these market liquidity variables are plotted for the ﬁve
days centered on March 13, 2003 in Figures 5 and 6. As expected, there was a very large buy-sell
disequilibrium on March 13, 2003 and there was a surge in the number of trades and traded volume
(both quantities are much larger than what is usually observed). However, the sub-ﬁgures for the
dynamics of the (deseasonalized) quoted spread, effective spread, trade aggressiveness, book depths
and price impacts all tell the same story: the book liquidity remained high and the trading process
was not characterized by a hectic behavior. In other words, the surge in trading activity and the
buy-sell disequilibrium indeed led to large intraday price changes (which is consistent with the fact
that the economic agents adjust their view on the Delhaize stock given the public news announce-
ments made by the company), but the book liquidity was adequate. This is perfectly exempliﬁed by
the sub-ﬁgure for the effective spread, which measures the actual trading costs faced by the market
participants: as far as the effective spread is concerned, March 13, 2003 was a ‘normal’ trading day.
5. Trading dynamics
In this section we analyze how the volatility level affects the interplay between the main liquidity
components (spreads, price impacts, average volume per trade,...) and the relationships between
liquidityandvolatility. Becausethisanalysishingesontheinvestigationofthedynamicsofliquidity,
we use Vector Autoregression (VAR) models applied to the original data sampled at the 15-minute
frequency. The VAR analysis will thus ﬁrst be performed on the whole dataset, and then on the
subsets deﬁned by the low- and high volatility states identiﬁed by the Markov switching model.22
5.1. VAR models and impulse response functions
We model the dynamics between liquidity and volatility using a VAR model. VAR models are to
some extent a-theoretical, in the sense that there is no need to specify the economic relationships.
Hence, we need to impose some restrictions on the estimated coefﬁcients to reconstruct the under-
lying structural model. In this paper, we consider a VAR(p) model of the following type:
22The use of VAR models to analyze high-frequency equidistantly time spaced data has been advocated by Joel






where Xt is the vector of endogenous variables and et is the usual error term. With respect to the
application considered in this paper, we estimate a 4-lag VAR (the lag dynamics is thus roughly
equal to one hour as we work with 15-minute intervals), with 7 variables (6 of the 7 variables
are endogenous and the last one is exogenous, see below). These variables, which have all been
previously deseasonalized by their respective time-of-day as described previously, are:
- Liquidity ex-ante: quoted spread and the price impact for a trade of 45,000 euros (average of the
ask and bid sides);
- Liquidity ex-post: effective spread and trade aggressiveness;
- Activity variables: number of trades and average volume per trade;
- Volatility.
Weﬁrsttestforblockexogeneityofeachofthevariablesandascertainthatonlytradeaggressive-
ness is exogenous at the 5% level. Thereafter, we thus estimate a VAR with 6 endogenous variables:
quoted spread, average price impact for a transaction of 45,000 euros, number of trades, average
volume per trade, the effective spread, and volatility; trade aggressiveness is the only exogenous
variable. Using the BIC criteria, we further reduce the dimension of the system as it indicates that
a 2-lag structure is adequate. Finally we estimate the selected VAR(2) model three times: ﬁrst with
all the observations, then with the observations belonging to the low volatility regime, and ﬁnally
with the observations which pertain to the high volatility regime. Using a Cholesky decomposition,







matrix V(et) is diagonal. It also allows the system analysis of the impact of a one-period shock to
a given variable, also called impulse response functions. We compute the 20-lag (5 hours, about
half a trading day) impulse response functions for the VAR model estimated ﬁrst with all the data,
and then with the data provided by the low- and high volatility regime classiﬁcation. For the ﬁrst
VAR(2) model as for the low- and high volatility regime VAR(2) models, we tried several endoge-
nous variable ordering to ascertain that the choice of ordering did not lead to different results. The
21impulse responses exhibit remarkably similar shapes whatever the ordering. This is important as it
implies that the correlation between the individual shocks ejt (where j denotes the j-th variable) is
small and thus does not appear as important as in many macroeconomic structural models. The main
argument as to why cross-correlations between shocks are large in macroeconomic models is that
the data is typically monthly/quarterly and thus lagged response to a single shock within the month
are aggregated and consequently treated as a contemporaneous impact when dealing with monthly
data. This suggests that the chosen 15-minute interval is small enough to avoid aggregation issues.
In both regimes, most of the impulse responses (detailed plots are available on request) are sig-
niﬁcantlydifferentfromzero (ﬂatIR),butthere arenomarkeddifferencesbetweenthelow-andhigh
volatility regimes (see below for additional discussion). Moreover, the conﬁdence intervals for the
high volatility regime are larger than for the low volatility regime; for many impulse responses, the
conﬁdence intervals for the low volatility regime lie within the ones for the high volatility regime.23
In all cases the width of the conﬁdence intervals strongly decreases after 4 periods on average, i.e.
roughly one hour. Furthermore, for volatility shocks and the impulse responses of a variable to its
own shock, impulse responses are signiﬁcantly different between regimes at the 95% conﬁdence
level. To improve on the impulse response analysis, we compute two additional statistics: half-life
times and cumulated impacts. These are deﬁned as follows. First, the cumulated impact of a shock
is deﬁned as the sum of the impulse responses over all 20 periods, it is thus the long-run impact of a
permanent shock. Secondly, the half-life is the time needed to achieve half of the cumulated impact,
it thus measures the speed of return to equilibrium.
5.2. Impulse response functions and the dynamics of liquidity
AllrelevantempiricalresultsaresummarizedinTablesVandVI, whichthussupplement/summarize
the description given below. We analyze the impulse response functions using a three-step proce-
dure. First, we look at their shapes as these are similar in low and high volatility regimes (see Table
V). Then we focus on the differences in the amplitude of the response to volatility shocks. Finally,
we present results regarding the half-life (Table VI). We put the variables in three groups: volatil-
ity, liquidity, both ex-ante (price impacts and the quoted spread) and ex-post (the effective spread),
and trading activity (average volume per trade and trading frequency as measured by the number of
trades).
23The number of observations in the low volatility regime is roughly twice the number of observations in the high
volatility regime.
22The VAR analysis ﬁrst shows that the impulse responses are remarkably similar in the low and
high volatility regimes. Volatility shocks drain both ex-ante and ex-post liquidity from the market.
Although liquidity drops, volatility shocks also foster trading activity. These results are consistent
with the literature: as the winner’s curse rises with volatility, limit order traders want to be better
rewarded for their provision of liquidity and the spread increases (see e.g. Foucault (1999)). This
explains why, in both regimes, we ﬁnd that liquidity drops when volatility surges. Moreover, if
volatility is a proxy for the arrival of information, an increase in volatility should be related to larger
and more frequent market orders. However, the response of the price impact to a volatility shock is
not clear-cut (in the high volatility regime only): for 4 stocks out of 10, the price impact decreases
when volatility rises, that is liquidity beyond the best prices is cheaper after a volatility shock. We
revisit this issue in the following paragraph.
Intheprevioussectionweshowedthattheimpulseresponsefunctionsinthelowandhighvolatil-
ity regimes are not statistically different, save for the volatility shocks and the impulse response of
a variable to its own shock. Let us now focus on the differences in the amplitude of the volatility
shocks. A one-standard-deviation volatility shock immediately increases the quoted spread by less
than 16% in the low volatility regime, and by 16% to 35% (depending on the stock) in the high
volatility regime. In the long run this is also the case as the quoted spread after a volatility shock in
the high volatility regime is larger than the quoted spread after a volatility shock in the low volatil-
ity regime. The results are not so clear-cut for the liquidity provided beyond the best prices. We
previously stressed that, for some stocks, the price impacts decrease after a volatility shock in the
high volatility regime, whereas they tend to increase in the low volatility regime. Therefore, it is
not surprising to ﬁnd that, in the long run and for two third of the stocks, the book is deeper after a
volatility shock in the high regime than in the low regime. Therefore, in contrast to what might be
perhaps be expected, the provision of liquidity does not break down in volatile periods.
Finally, resiliency is a crucial issue for the continuity of the trading process. Table VI shows that
liquidity is more resilient to volatility shocks in the high volatility regime than in the low volatility
regime: half of the shock is incorporated into the spread after half an hour in the low regime, while
45 minutes are needed in the high volatility regime. For the price impacts, we have respectively
half an hour and one hour. The results are consistent with a more active monitoring of limit orders
by traders in periods where the winner’s curse is more important. Nevertheless, traders update their
orders’ position in the book, whether at the best quotes or further in the book, more quickly in
response to a shock in trading activity. To sum things us, our VAR analysis thus demonstrates that,
23although shocks have larger impacts on average in high volatility regimes, they are still absorbed
quite rapidly. Therefore, the VAR analysis supports the evidence presented in the previous section,
i.e. that liquidity does not drain from the market during high volatility regimes.
6. Conclusion
Using limit order book and transaction data for ﬁve large-cap and ﬁve mid-cap Belgian stocks traded
on the Euronext system, we study the contemporaneous relationships between different liquidity
measuresandmarketvolatility. Weconsiderex-ante(e.g. quotedspread, bidandpricepriceimpacts,
depths) and ex-post (e.g. effective spread, trade aggressiveness) liquidity measures which are fully
available once complete order book data is at hand. From an econometric point of view, we work
with the realized volatility as popularized recently in Andersen and Bollerslev (1998), which allows
us to deﬁne a low and high volatility regime based on Markov switching techniques. Thereafter, we
thus assess the different relationships (mostly modelled as log-log regressions on the appropriately
deﬁned liquidity measures) with all the data, and then separately in the low and high volatility
regimes. Our analysis thus sheds light on the behavior of automated auction markets in times of low
and high volatility, and allows us to quantify the impact of the switch in volatility regimes on key
ex-ante and ex-post liquidity measures relevant for traders and/or institutional investors.
Our results indicate that the provision of liquidity in the Euronext trading system seems to be
quite resilient to increases in volatility. Indeed, the (static) slopes of these liquidity measures -
volatility relationships (e.g. effective spread - volatility or trade aggressiveness - volatility relation-
ships for example) do not signiﬁcantly change when volatility switches from the low volatility to the
high volatility regime. In contrast, the mean (or expected value) of each liquidity measure is usually
signiﬁcantly higher in the high volatility state, but this was expected from the market microstructure
literature. Moreover, the dynamic analysis conﬁrms that liquidity behaves similarly in both regimes,
although the amplitude of the response and the resilience of the market differs. As such, the main
empirical result of this study is that there is no real important deterioration in the provision of liq-
uidity when volatility increases, although we do ﬁnd that it is more costly to trade when volatility is
high.
As shown in many theoretical studies, adverse selection increases when volatility increases,
which results in a more costly provision of limit orders. As a consequence, market liquidity drops
24when volatility increases. In periods of ﬁnancial distress, this is the one of the main concerns for
central banks since this behavior may lead to the collapse or near-collapse of ﬁnancial markets (e.g.
the October 1987 market meltdown and the LTCM failure in 1998, among others). As recently
suggested by Mishkin and White (2002), a ﬁnancial crisis combined with a large drop in liquidity
can be avoided with prompt and adequate action by monetary authorities. The concern about a
systemic drop in ﬁnancial liquidity, shared by many studies (see e.g. Borio and Lowe (2002) and
Borio (2003)), leads many academics and practitioners to suggest that central banks should perhaps
play a regulatory role in ﬁnancial markets. However and given the many ways stock markets can
be set up (pure order book market, price-driven market, hybrid market), the ﬁrst natural step is to
understand the dynamics of liquidity in stress vs normal periods for each type of market. While
this kind of study had already been done for some price-driven markets or for some hybrid markets,
no empirical study had yet focused on that topic for pure order book platform such as Euronext.
Regarding the behavior of liquidity in high volatility regimes, the results presented in this paper are
particularly promising. Indeed, even if trading costs are larger in stress periods, the trading system
does not seem to break down.
Our results pave the way for additional research linked to that topic. An obvious extension would
be to assess our relationships on an extended dataset which would feature a much larger number of
stocks sub-divided into smaller groups based on the ﬁrms’ characteristics. In this extended setting,
we could thus quantify the possible deterioration in the provision of liquidity according to the most
salient characteristics of the stock (e.g. small-cap, mid-cap, large-cap; type of industry;...). It could
also be argued that the Markov switching algorithm should be applied to the overall market volatility
(for example the volatility of the index) to study systemic risk. A crucial question for central bankers
and exchanges is to ascertain which trading platform best performs during high volatility regimes.
Extending the present methodology to allows comparisons of the liquidity supply and trading costs
in specialist markets vis-a-vis order book markets would shed additional light on the role of market
makers in hybrid structures.
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N Effective spread Trade aggressiveness Limit orders
Elasticity Signiﬁcant Elasticity Signiﬁcant Elasticity Signiﬁcant
COLRUYT 409 0.281 1/1 0.329 1/1 0.028 1/1
FORTIS 409 0.101 1/1 0.074 1/1 -0.005 0/1
ALL STOCKS 409 0.221 10/10 0.157 10/10 0.032 8/10
Low volatility regime
N Effective spread Trade aggressiveness Limit orders
Elasticity Signiﬁcant Elasticity Signiﬁcant Elasticity Signiﬁcant
COLRUYT 320 0.259 1/1 0.382 1/1 0.018 0/1
FORTIS 323 0.074 1/1 0.066 1/1 0.001 0/1
ALL STOCKS - 0.213 10/10 0.184 10/10 0.032 7/10
High volatility regime
N Effective spread Trade aggressiveness Limit orders
Elasticity Signiﬁcant Elasticity Signiﬁcant Elasticity Signiﬁcant
COLRUYT 88 0.063 0/1 0.222 1/1 0.029 0/1
FORTIS 86 0.003 0/1 -0.041 0/1 -0.002 0/1
ALL STOCKS - 0.175 7/10 0.150 4/10 0.005 0/10
Outputs of the log-log regressions where the dependent variable is successively the aggregated ef-
fective spread, the aggregated trade aggressiveness and the percentage of limit orders, the indepen-
dent variable is the realized volatility in all cases. All measures are computed over the [9h:11h],
[11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals and are deseasonalized (by their respective time-of-
day) prior to running the regressions. The panel ‘Low volatility regime’ gives the outputs for the
sub-datasets where the realized volatility is in the low volatility regime; the panel ‘High volatility
regime’ gives the outputs for the sub-datasets where the realized volatility is in the high volatility
regime. We provide results for the COLRUYT stock (smallest cap), FORTIS stock (largest cap) and
for all stocks. In that latter case, we report the mean elasticity. The column ‘Signiﬁcant’ reports the



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































% change in the mean of each deseasonalized variable when switching from the low- to the
high volatility regime.
Limit Realized Effective Trade Quoted Bid Ask
orders volatility spread aggressiveness spread Depth PI3 Depth PI3
COLRUYT 7.7 390.6 91 32.4 88.5 -1.8 66.1 -4.9 34.2
FORTIS -1.7 337.3 23.6 11.8 21.3 2.8 16.5 -11.8 6.3
ALLSTOCKS 6.3 388.1 51.2 17.1 54 -3.2 34.1 -7.3 31.3
The table reports the % change in the mean of each deseasonalized variable when switching from the low-
to the high volatility regime. Depth corresponds to the depth at the best prices. PI3 corresponds to the price
impacts computed for a transaction of 45,000 Euros. The null hypothesis of the equality in means is rejected at
the 5% level for all variables except for the bid depth.
Table V
The dynamics of liquidity.
shock volatility av. volu nb tr pi3 qsp sp
L H L H L H L H L H L H
volatility + + + +
av. volu + + + + - -
nb tr + + + + - - -
pi3 + + - + + +
qsp + + +- - - -+ -+ + + + +
sp + + + +- - - + + + +
This table presents a summary of the VAR results (analysis of the dy-
namics of liquidity). A “+” (“-”) means that the shock on the given
variable (in the top row) has a positive (negative) and signiﬁcant impact
on the variable (in the ﬁrst column). In a few cases, we report a “-+”,
which indicates that the shock is ﬁrst negative and then positive. “H”
refers to the high volatility state, while “L” refers to the low volatility
state. Note that av. volu relates to the average volume per trade, nb
tr, the number of trades, pi3, the level 3 price impact, qsp, the quoted
spread, sp, the effective spread.
33Table VI
Half-life of the impulse responses.
shock volatility av. volu nb tr pi3 qsp sp
volatility 15 30
av. volu 15 15 15
nb tr 30 (45) 30 15 15
pi3 1H (30 mn) 15 30 (15 mn) 1H30
qsp 45 (30) 15 15 1H15 15 30
sp 1H (30) 15 15 (30) 45 15
Thistablereports thehalf-life ofthe impulseresponses (averagedacross
the 10 stocks). All results are expressed in minutes except when there
is an “H” (for hour). We only report results for the signiﬁcant impulse
responses. All results are for the low- and high volatility states, except
when there is a number in parenthesis (high volatility state). Note that
av. volu relates to the average volume per trade, nb tr, the number of
trades, pi3, the level 3 price impact, qsp, the quoted spread, sp, the
effective spread.
34Figure 1. Colruyt. From top left to bottom right: stock price (sampled at 15-minute intervals),
time-of-day for the volatility, time-of-day for the traded volume, time-of-day for the ask inside
depth, time-of-day for the current and effective spread and time-of-day for the bid price impacts.
The time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
35Figure 2. Fortis. From top left to bottom right: stock price (sampled at 15-minute intervals), time-
of-day for the volatility, time-of-day for the traded volume, time-of-day for the ask inside depth,
time-of-day for the current and effective spread and time-of-day for the bid price impacts. The time
period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
36Figure 3. Aggregated effective spread vs realized volatility (Colruyt and Fortis). Relationship
between the aggregated effective spread and the realized volatility. The aggregated effective spread
is the average effective spread over the [9h:11h], [11h:13h], [13h:15h] and [15h:17h30] intervals;
the realized volatility is deﬁned over the same intervals. Both measures are deseasonalized by their
respective time-of-day. The time period is December 2, 2002 to April 30, 2003.
37Figure 4. Delhaize (event study). Price pattern for the ﬁve days centered on March 13, 2003.
38Figure 5. Delhaize (event study). Trade dynamics and market liquidity (all variables are deseason-
alized) for the ﬁve days centered on March 13, 2003.
39Figure 6. Delhaize (event study). Book dynamics and market liquidity (all variables are deseason-
alized) for the ﬁve days centered on March 13, 2003.
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